- The US offshore wind industry has been through its worst crisis since inception, with multiple developers cancelling or renegotiating Power Purchase Agreements (PPAs) due to cost inflation, supply chain price escalation, and interest rate impacts on project economics — a cascade that threatened to unwind years of policy progress.
- Federal permitting through BOEM (Bureau of Ocean Energy Management) has improved in pace but remains complex, with the process for Environmental Impact Statements, Right of Way grants, and Construction and Operations Plans (COPs) still taking four to six years from lease award to construction start.
- The IRA (Inflation Reduction Act) investment tax credits have provided essential financial lifeline for projects that survived the 2022-2023 crisis, and a new generation of project financings is progressing — but the US supply chain remains underdeveloped, and Jones Act vessel constraints continue to add costs that European projects don’t face.
The PPA Crisis: How the Numbers Stopped Working
The US offshore wind industry’s crisis of 2022-2023 was a collision between ambitious policy targets, contract prices locked in before a cost inflation cycle, and the brutal arithmetic of rising interest rates on capital-intensive infrastructure projects. Understanding how it happened is essential to understanding where the industry stands in 2026.
US offshore wind developers — primarily European majors including Ørsted, Equinor, BP, Avangrid (Iberdrola), and Ocean Wind — had secured Power Purchase Agreements with East Coast state utilities (New Jersey, New York, Massachusetts, Connecticut) in a series of competitive procurement rounds between 2019 and 2022. These PPAs locked in electricity prices — typically in the range of $80-100 per MWh — that reflected project cost estimates developed in 2018-2021, before the supply chain disruption of COVID-19, before the commodity price inflation of 2021-2022, and before the Fed’s interest rate tightening cycle that began in March 2022.
By late 2022 and into 2023, the economics of almost every major US offshore wind project had broken down. Monopile prices had increased 30-50% from pre-inflation estimates. WTG supply costs had risen. Specialist installation vessel day-rates had escalated. The cost of financing — driven by the rapid increase in benchmark interest rates — had increased project LCOE by 20-30% relative to models built at 2020 interest rates. The PPAs signed at $85/MWh were suddenly uneconomic for projects now expected to cost $120-140/MWh to deliver.
The consequence: Ørsted cancelled its Ocean Wind 1 and 2 projects, writing off approximately $4 billion in sunk development costs. BP and Equinor sought PPA renegotiation in New York. Avangrid terminated its Commonwealth Wind PPA in Massachusetts. SouthCoast Wind was cancelled by its developers (Shell and Ocean Winds). The wave of cancellations between late 2022 and mid-2023 represented the wholesale evaporation of several gigawatts of contracted US offshore wind capacity.
The IRA Lifeline
The Inflation Reduction Act, signed by President Biden in August 2022, provided the financial mechanism that prevented a complete US offshore wind collapse. The IRA’s Investment Tax Credit (ITC) and Production Tax Credit (PTC) provisions — applicable to offshore wind facilities that begin construction by 2033 — provide a dollar-for-dollar reduction in federal tax liability equal to 30% of qualified project capital costs (ITC) or 2.75 cents per kWh of production (PTC). For projects meeting domestic content requirements, an additional 10-percentage-point bonus applies.
The ITC and PTC have materially improved the economics of projects that survived the 2022-2023 crisis. For a project with a capital cost of $6-8 billion, a 30% ITC represents $1.8-2.4 billion in federal tax credits — equivalent to a significant reduction in the effective equity cost of the project. This has allowed several projects that would otherwise have been uneconomic to restructure their financing, renegotiate their PPAs at higher prices, and proceed toward FID.
The practical complication is monetising the ITC. Offshore wind developers are typically not large taxpayers — they’re special purpose vehicles with limited tax liability. Monetising the ITC requires either a tax equity investor (a financial institution with sufficient tax appetite) or a direct pay election (introduced by the IRA for non-profit entities) or a transferability mechanism (also introduced by the IRA, allowing credits to be sold). The tax equity market has been busy, with banks including J.P. Morgan, Bank of America, and Goldman Sachs acting as tax equity investors in offshore wind project financings.
BOEM Permitting: Progress and Persistent Challenges
BOEM has substantially increased its offshore wind permitting throughput since 2021, driven by the Biden administration’s 30 GW by 2030 target and associated executive actions to streamline the environmental review process. The agency has completed COPs for several major projects and has expedited elements of the Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) process.
However, the fundamental timeline for a US offshore wind project from lease award to first power remains four to six years in best-case scenarios — and frequently longer. The EIS process, which involves extensive consultation with federal agencies (US Fish and Wildlife Service, NOAA, FAA, DoD, Coast Guard), state and local governments, tribal nations, commercial fishing interests, and tourism and maritime stakeholders, is inherently complex and cannot be indefinitely accelerated without legal challenge risk.
The fishing community opposition to US offshore wind has been one of the most persistent and organised objections in the sector globally. The Northeast commercial fishing industry — scallops, lobster, groundfish — relies on areas that overlap substantially with the proposed US East Coast offshore wind development zone, and the fishing community’s concerns about cable strike risk, foundation interference with bottom trawling, and electromagnetic effects on species behaviour have been a consistent feature of the public comment and litigation process. Several projects have faced legal challenges from fishing groups, causing additional delays.
The Jones Act: America’s Self-Imposed Supply Chain Challenge
The Jones Act — the Merchant Marine Act of 1920 — requires that vessels operating between two US ports be US-built, US-flagged, and US-crewed. For offshore wind installation, this creates a specific problem: the large jack-up vessels used to install WTGs and foundations are not built in the US, and the Jones Act makes it illegal for a foreign-flagged vessel to transport goods (including turbine components) from one US port to another.
The practical consequence is that European offshore wind installation vessels — the Cadeler fleet, DEME’s Orion, Van Oord’s Boreas — cannot directly participate in US offshore wind installation without a complex feeder logistics arrangement involving US-flagged feeder vessels. This adds cost, reduces efficiency, and creates scheduling complexity that doesn’t exist for European projects.
The US government has been supporting the development of Jones Act-compliant offshore wind installation vessels. Dominion Energy’s Charybdis — built at Keppel AmFELS in Texas — became the first US-built, US-flagged offshore wind installation vessel when it delivered in 2023. Its operational debut has been watched closely by the industry as evidence that a US WTIV (Wind Turbine Installation Vessel) fleet is genuinely possible.
State of the Pipeline: Who’s Still Standing?
After the 2022-2023 cancellations and restructurings, the US offshore wind pipeline in 2026 looks different — smaller, more cautious, but not dead. Vineyard Wind (800 MW, offshore Massachusetts) is in construction, with Vestas V236-15.0 MW turbines being installed by a combination of Jones Act and European vessels using the feeder workaround. Revolution Wind (704 MW, Rhode Island-Connecticut) is in construction. Sunrise Wind and Coastal Virginia Offshore Wind — the utility-owned Dominion Energy project — are advancing.
The New York and New Jersey programmes have been restarted with revised PPA prices in the $120-150/MWh range, reflecting the updated cost environment. New England states have similarly adjusted their procurement frameworks. The higher prices are economically necessary and politically uncomfortable — they raise consumer electricity bills in states that had sold offshore wind partly on cost reduction promises. The political sustainability of the programme depends on delivering projects that work and that demonstrate value for money at the new price levels.
The 30 GW by 2030 target is effectively unachievable from today’s starting point — the pipeline delays and cancellations have pushed the realistic target to something more like 15-20 GW by 2035. The industry’s credibility with state regulators, utilities, and ratepayers depends critically on executing the surviving projects successfully and rebuilding trust after the disruption of the 2022-2023 crisis. There is no room for further major project failures.

