Offshore oil and gas production platform at sea with cranes and processing modulesOffshore oil and gas platform at sea
  • TotalEnergies’ 13.1 mtpa Mozambique LNG project remains suspended under force majeure declared in April 2021 following the Cabo Delgado insurgency — five years on, the security situation has improved but project restart remains uncertain.
  • The ENI-operated Coral South FLNG — the world’s first deepwater FLNG vessel — has been producing and exporting LNG from the Rovuma Basin since 2022, proving the basin’s technical viability and maintaining commercial momentum for the broader East Africa LNG story.
  • Mozambique sits atop the largest undeveloped gas province in Africa, with over 100 tcf of recoverable resources in the Rovuma Basin — the commercial question is whether the political and security risks can be managed well enough to attract the capital needed for full development.

The Promise of the Rovuma Basin

When Anadarko and ENI made back-to-back gas discoveries in the Rovuma Basin offshore northern Mozambique in 2010-2012, the industry’s reaction ranged from cautious interest to barely concealed excitement. Here was a genuinely frontier deepwater gas province, in waters depths of 1,500 to 2,500 metres, with reservoir quality and well productivity that suggested something very large indeed. The initial appraisal confirmed recoverable gas resources of well over 100 trillion cubic feet (tcf) in the combined Area 1 (Anadarko, later TotalEnergies) and Area 4 (ENI) licences.

For perspective, 100 tcf of recoverable gas is broadly equivalent to the proven reserves of the United Kingdom and Norway combined. This wasn’t a minor discovery — this was a basin-scale find that could support multiple world-scale LNG trains for decades. The Mozambique government, one of the poorest countries in sub-Saharan Africa, understandably viewed the development as transformational for national revenues.

The journey from discovery to production has, however, been tortuous — a case study in how geological promise and commercial ambition can be undermined by political complexity, security challenges, financing constraints, and plain bad timing.

Coral South FLNG: The One That Actually Works

Credit where it is due: ENI’s Area 4 development, centred on the Coral South FLNG vessel, has performed well. The Coral Sul FLNG — designed by TechnipFMC and constructed at Samsung Heavy Industries in South Korea, with a topsides LNG capacity of 3.4 million tonnes per annum — achieved first LNG cargo in November 2022. It was a genuine industry milestone: the world’s first commercial deepwater FLNG installation, operating in water depths of around 2,000 metres.

The vessel is moored over the Coral South field on a spread mooring system, producing, treating, liquefying, and loading LNG without the need for onshore infrastructure. The entire value chain from wellhead to LNG tanker happens offshore — an elegant technical solution to a country with limited onshore infrastructure and significant logistics challenges. BP holds all offtake from Coral South under a 20-year sales and purchase agreement, a contractual structure that provided the revenue certainty needed to secure project financing.

By mid-2026, Coral South is operating at or near its nameplate capacity, reliably loading LNG cargoes onto Q-Flex carriers for delivery to European and Asian markets. The project demonstrates that offshore Mozambique can work technically — the reservoirs perform well, the weather window for LNG operations is manageable, and the FLNG technology, while expensive, is operationally viable in this environment.

ENI and its partners — ExxonMobil (25% in Area 4 via the 2017 farm-down), CNPC, ENH (Mozambique’s state company), Galp, KOGAS, and Mozambique Rovuma Venture — are now evaluating a Coral North FLNG to monetise the remaining Area 4 gas resources. A final investment decision on Coral North has been deferred multiple times but remains on the agenda.

Mozambique LNG Area 1: The Project That Went Dark

The contrast between Coral South and TotalEnergies’ Area 1 Mozambique LNG project could hardly be more stark. Area 1 — now TotalEnergies’ following the $3.9 billion acquisition of Anadarko’s LNG assets in 2019 — had reached an advanced stage of development when events in Cabo Delgado province fundamentally changed the risk calculus.

The project was sanctioned in June 2019 at a total cost of approximately $20 billion, making it one of the largest private sector investments in sub-Saharan Africa. Two onshore liquefaction trains with combined capacity of 13.1 mtpa were under construction at the Afungi Peninsula site in Cabo Delgado province when the Islamist insurgency — Ansar al-Sunna, locally known as Al-Shabaab (unrelated to the Somali group) — dramatically escalated in violence.

In March 2021, insurgents attacked and briefly occupied the town of Mocímboa da Praia, just 60 kilometres from the Afungi construction site. TotalEnergies declared force majeure and evacuated its workforce in April 2021. The project has been suspended since.

The security situation in Cabo Delgado has evolved significantly since 2021, partly through the intervention of Rwandan Defence Forces and SADC Mission in Mozambique (SAMIM) troops, which degraded the insurgency’s operational capability and recaptured several key towns. By 2024-2025, the security environment around the Afungi area had improved materially, and TotalEnergies began conducting security assessments and preliminary site visits.

However, the insurgency has not been eliminated — it has fragmented and dispersed. Isolated attacks in rural areas of Cabo Delgado continue. TotalEnergies has been characteristically cautious about communicating a restart timeline, acknowledging that the security improvement is real but that sustained stability is required before it can commit to bringing thousands of construction workers back to the site. As of mid-2026, no official restart date has been announced.

The Financial Architecture: Who Bears the Cost of Delay

The financial consequences of the suspension are considerable for all parties. TotalEnergies had committed approximately $3-4 billion to construction before the force majeure — civils, onshore infrastructure, and procurement work that now sits idle. The total sunk cost across the joint venture (partners include Mitsui, ONGC Videsh, Bharat Petroleum, ENH, and PTT) is substantial, and the longer the project remains suspended, the greater the risk of cost escalation when construction eventually resumes.

The project financing — a $15 billion senior secured lending package arranged by a group of international and development finance institutions including Standard Bank, Société Générale, Sumitomo Mitsui Banking Corporation, and export credit agencies from the US, UK, Japan, and others — contains provisions for extended suspension and potential acceleration of repayment in certain circumstances. The lenders have been patient, but patience has limits, and the clock has been running for over five years.

For Mozambique’s government, the delay represents an enormous opportunity cost. The fiscal projections underpinning the country’s development plans assumed LNG revenues flowing by the mid-2020s. Instead, the country has Coral South — a relatively modest revenue contributor given its 3.4 mtpa capacity — and the promise of something much larger that has yet to materialise. The macroeconomic consequences for one of the world’s least developed countries are severe.

The LNG Market Context: Does Mozambique Still Make Commercial Sense?

Beyond the security question, a legitimate commercial debate exists about whether Mozambique LNG’s economics remain attractive in a market that has been reshaped significantly since the project’s original sanction. When Mozambique LNG was sanctioned in 2019, Qatar’s North Field expansion was not yet approved, US LNG expansion was in its early stages, and a 13 mtpa greenfield project in East Africa was a highly competitive source of supply.

Fast forward to 2026, and the LNG supply landscape looks very different. Qatar is adding 48 mtpa of new capacity through the North Field East and North Field South expansions. The US has sanctioned further brownfield expansion at Sabine Pass, Corpus Christi, and Port Arthur. Australia’s existing LNG infrastructure is being considered for brownfield expansion. The global LNG market faces a potential supply glut in the late 2020s as this new capacity comes online.

Mozambique LNG would be entering this market as a high-cost greenfield project in a challenging operating environment, competing against Qatar barrels with sub-$3/mmbtu production costs. The project’s original offtake contracts — with JERA, EDF, CPC, ENI, CNOOC, and others — remain legally binding, providing revenue foundation. But the long-term commercial case for massive further expansion beyond Area 1 is more complex in the current supply environment than it appeared in 2019.

East Africa’s Broader Gas Ambitions

Tanzania sits north of Mozambique with its own substantial deepwater gas resource base — the Mkuranga, Chaza, Zafarani, and Lavani fields offshore the Ruvuma and Mandawa Basins hold combined recoverable resources estimated at 40-50 tcf. Shell, Equinor, and Ophir Energy (now part of Medco Energi) have been involved in Tanzanian exploration, but the development of a Tanzania LNG project has been even more prolonged than Mozambique’s, bedevilled by complex fiscal negotiations between the government, state company TPDC, and international partners.

The Shell-operated Tanzania LNG project, centred on the offshore Likong’o, Mzia, and Jodari fields, completed its FEED work but has never reached FID. The latest assessment suggests that the earliest Tanzania LNG could reach FID is the late 2020s, with first cargo not before the mid-2030s.

The East African gas province therefore remains genuinely significant in global energy terms — the resources are real, the geology is proven, and the long-term demand case for LNG in Asian markets supports the economics. But the path from resource to LNG cargo has been, and continues to be, far more difficult than the initial discovery excitement suggested. Security, politics, financing complexity, and now competitive market dynamics are all working against rapid development.

Outlook: When Does the Mozambique Story Resume?

The most optimistic credible scenario for Mozambique LNG Area 1 restart involves a formal security assessment sign-off by TotalEnergies in late 2026 or early 2027, followed by a contractor remobilisation plan and a revised construction schedule. Given the extent of the project that was already built before the suspension — substantial civils work, fabrication, and marine infrastructure was in place at Afungi — a restart could potentially see first LNG within three to four years of recommencement of construction, pointing to first cargo around 2030.

The pessimistic scenario involves continued security instability, insurance and financing complications, and a decision by TotalEnergies and partners to fundamentally reassess the project scope or structure — potentially downsizing from two trains to one, or restructuring the financing. There have been industry rumours about TotalEnergies exploring options including partial stake sales or a restructured project configuration, but nothing has been confirmed.

For Mozambique, the stakes could hardly be higher. The country’s long-term development trajectory depends materially on whether Area 1 eventually reaches production. The Rovuma Basin resources are there — the challenge is whether the enabling environment can be created to unlock them. That challenge is as much political, security-related, and financial as it is technical — a reminder that in the LNG business, geology is often the easy part.