Key Takeaways:
- South Korea has set a target of 14.3 GW of offshore wind by 2030 and over 30 GW by 2040 — driven by President Yoon’s (subsequently impeached) energy policy reversal followed by a renewed offshore wind commitment under the subsequent administration — creating a market that is both politically complex and commercially enormous for developers willing to navigate its rapidly changing regulatory landscape.
- Japan’s offshore wind programme, enabled by the 2019 Act on Promotion of Use of Sea Areas for Maritime Renewable Energy, has advanced into its first commercial round allocations at Noshiro, Yurihonjo, and Okinoshima — but faces structural grid integration challenges on an island nation with limited interconnection and sharp regional demand concentrations.
- Northeast Asian local content requirements — both formal and informal — are the dominant commercial challenge for international developers seeking entry into Korean and Japanese markets, with domestic shipyards, steelmakers, and turbine assembly requirements effectively mandating local partnerships that alter the economics of any project.
South Korea: Ambition Meets Political Complexity
South Korea’s offshore wind story has been shaped by dramatic political swings that make Taiwan’s policy environment look stable by comparison. The Moon government (2017–2022) set aggressive renewable targets and positioned offshore wind as a centrepiece of the Green New Deal. The Yoon government (2022–2024) shifted emphasis back to nuclear power and created uncertainty about the offshore wind programme. Yoon’s subsequent impeachment and the transition to a new administration has, as of 2026, resulted in a recommitment to offshore wind alongside nuclear — a pragmatic energy mix approach that recognises Korea’s acute electricity demand growth and limited domestic fuel resources.
The commercial reality is that South Korea’s offshore wind potential is exceptional. The Yellow Sea and the southern coasts have consistent wind resources at 7–9 m/s mean speed, water depths suitable for fixed-bottom installation in many locations, and grid infrastructure that — with reinforcement — can absorb offshore wind output. The first commercial-scale projects — GS E&C/Macquarie/Copenhagen Infrastructure Partners’ Jeonnam 1 and 2, the POSCO-linked projects, and government-backed KEPCO programme — are advancing through development despite the political turbulence, sustained by long-term commercial logic rather than moment-to-moment political support.
Local content requirements are the defining commercial challenge for international developers. Korean steelmakers (POSCO, Hyundai Steel) and shipyards (HD Hyundai, Hanwha Ocean) are expecting and receiving significant volumes of monopile, jacket foundation, and offshore substation work from Korean offshore wind projects. Turbine assembly in Korea — either through agreements with Vestas or Siemens Gamesa for Korean licence manufacturing, or through development of domestically designed turbines by Doosan Enerbility — is a government priority. The net effect is project costs 20–30% above equivalent European projects at current volumes, with the expectation that Korean industrialisation will reduce these premiums over time as scale develops.
Japan: Structured Progress in a Complex Grid Environment
Japan’s offshore wind development has followed a more methodical path than Korea’s — driven by the structured Promotion Zone designation process under the 2019 Act, which identifies specific offshore areas for development, conducts competitive allocation processes, and then provides grid connection rights and long-term Feed-in Premium support for selected projects. The first three commercial-scale allocations — at Noshiro, Yurihonjo, and Okinoshima in Akita Prefecture — were awarded to a consortium including Equinor, J-Power, Tohoku Electric Power, and Marubeni in what was the largest offshore wind tender in Japanese history.
Japan’s grid integration challenge is structurally more complex than most other offshore wind markets. The Japanese electricity system is divided between 60 Hz (western Japan) and 50 Hz (eastern Japan) networks with limited interconnection between them, and each regional grid is operated by a vertically integrated regional utility with strong control over grid access and connection terms. Offshore wind projects must negotiate connection agreements with regional utilities that have historically been protective of their monopoly positions and have not moved quickly to accommodate new entrants.
The offshore grid connection cost in Japan — which falls primarily on the project developer rather than being socialised across the transmission network as in some European markets — is a significant cost driver that distinguishes Japanese offshore wind economics from European equivalents. A 1 GW offshore wind project requiring 60 km of submarine cable and substantial onshore substation upgrades might face grid connection costs of ¥50–100 billion ($300–600 million) that are not recoverable under the Feed-in Premium mechanism at current tariff levels, compressing project IRRs toward the margin of viability.
Despite these challenges, the commercial opportunity in Japan is significant enough that international developers — Equinor, RWE, Vattenfall, and several others — are committed to the market. Japan’s electricity import dependence (over 90% of energy imported before the energy transition), its absolute requirement for reliable low-carbon power to meet its 2050 carbon neutral commitment, and the sheer scale of the market (the world’s third largest economy) make offshore wind in Japan a long-term strategic priority regardless of near-term development complexity.

